We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. Anonymity in welfare is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires allocation rules to treat agents equally in welfare terms from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities. We show that the Vickrey allocation rule is the unique allocation rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. 
Introduction
We consider the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good among a group of agents when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a nonnegative price. For example, imagine that a government allocates a fixed number of licenses to private firms, or that it distributes equally divided lands to households. 4 A number of allocation rules, including several forms of auction, have been proposed for various social purposes such as efficiency, revenue maximization, etc. For the purpose of efficiency, it is known that one rule has a remarkable feature. It is the Vickrey (allocation) rule. First, the Vickrey rule allocates the good to those agents who valuation it most highly (Efficiency). Second, it extracts true information on agents' valuations from them (Strategy-proofness). Third, it induces agents' voluntary participation (Individual rationality). Most importantly, the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying these three properties. It is also known that this rule satisfies a condition of impartiality, which we call anonymity in welfare. In this paper, we characterize the Vickrey rule by focusing on this impartiality condition instead of efficiency. Our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey rule has a remarkable feature for the purpose of impartiality as well.
An (allocation) rule is generally formulated as a function from the set of agents' valuations to the feasible set. Given a rule, as the agents' private valuations are not known to the other agents, there may be incentives for agents to misrepresent their valuations in order to manipulate the final outcomes in their favor. As a result, the actual outcomes may not constitute a socially desirable allocation relative to the agents' true valuations. If a rule is immune to such behavior, that is, if each agent's dominant strategy is to announce his true valuation, then the rule is said to be strategy-proof. In addition, a condition of individual rationality is often imposed on rules to induce agents' participation; it says that a rule never selects an allocation that makes some agent worse off than he would be if he received no good and paid nothing. It is important to know what rules satisfy efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. The Vickrey rule does; for this rule, the agents with the m highest valuations of the goods receive one unit each and pay the (m + 1)-th valuation, while the other agents pay nothing, where m is the number of the units of the indivisible good to be allocated. It is proved in the literature mentioned later that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. This result emphasizes the distinguished importance of the Vickrey rule for the purpose of efficiency in the environment where strategy-proofness and individual rationality are indispensable.
However, society members are often more concerned with impartiality than with efficiency. Anonymity in bundles is a condition of impartiality in the sense that it requires rules to treat agents equally from the viewpoint of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities; it states that when the valuations of two agents are swapped, their bundles under the rule are also swapped. Anonymity in bundles is employed as a impartiality condition in many literature such as Sprumont (1991) , Moulin (1994) , Barberà and Jackson (1995) , Serizawa (1999) , etc. However, no rule satisfies anonymity in bundles in our model. A condition embodying a similar idea of impartiality is anonymity in welfare; it states that when the valuations of two agents are swapped, their welfares under the rule are also swapped. This condition is weaker than anonymity in bundle, and is satisfied by many interesting rules including the Vickrey rule even in our model. Thus, anonymity in welfare is a suitable condition of impartiality in this article. We establish that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality (Theorem 2).
We discuss other literature related to our result. Holmström (1979) analyzes models with public alternatives and money, and establishes that a rule satisfies efficiency and strategy-proofness if and only if it is a rule of the class of rules, called "Groves rules." Since allocating indivisibles can be interpreted as public alternatives, his result can be applied to our model 5 , and imply that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. 6 Recently, Chew and Serizawa (2007) characterize the Vickrey rule similarly by induction logic.
There is also a body of literature analyzing the fairness of the Vickrey rule. Most of it focuses on envy-freeness. A rule is envy-free if no agent prefers another agent's consumption bundle to his own. In a more general model with heterogeneous indivisible goods where nonquasi-linear preferences are accommodated, Svensson (1983) shows that envy-freeness of allocation implies efficiency. 7 This result, together with Holmström (1979) , and Chew and Serizawa (2007) , implies that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, envy-freeness, and individual rationality. In this article, we do not impose envy-freeness on rules, and so we cannot apply Svensson's (1983) result. Instead, we show that strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality together imply efficiency (Proposition). This result, together with Holmström (1979) , and Chew and Serizawa (2007) , implies our characterization of the Vickrey rule (Theorem 2). Focusing on anonymity in welfare, our characterization emphasizes that the Vickrey rule also has a remarkable impartiality property, and it complements Holmström's (1979) result, Chew and Serizawa (2007) , and those of Atlamaz and Yengin (2008) , and Moulin (2010) .
Some authors investigate the logical relationship of anonymity with other conditions in general models. For example, Pápai's (2003) results entail that under efficiency and strategy-proofness, envy-freeness implies anonymity in welfare. Yengin (2009) shows that under efficiency and strategy-proofness, equal welfare for equals is equivalent to anonymity in welfare. Our article also complements those results. Section 2 sets up the model, defines basic notions, and states the main result. Section 3 concludes by discussing open questions. Appendix provides the proof of the Proposition that strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality together imply efficiency. 5 Holmström's (1979) result can be applied to more general models where there are several indivisible goods and agents consume more than one indivisible good. 6 Similar characterizations of Groves' rules in models with public alternatives have been previously established by Green and Laffont (1977) , and Walker (1978) . However, the characterizations of these two articles cannot be applied to allocation rules of indivisible goods because they assume that the class of admissible preferences includes preferences that are not admissible in the model of indivisible goods allocation. 7 See also Alkan, Demange and Gale (1991), Maskin (1987) and Tadenuma and Thomson (1991)
Section 2 Model and Main Result
The set of agents is N = {1, . . . , n}. There are m units of an indivisible good. An item allocation is a n−tuple x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n such that P x i = m, where for each i ∈ N, x i is the number of units of the good agent i receives. 8 Since x i = 0 or x i = 1 for each i ∈ N, agents can receive at most one unit of the good. We denote the set of item allocations by X, that is, X = {x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ {0, 1} n : P x i = m}. For each i ∈ N, we denote agent i's payment by p i ∈ R + . We assume that payments are nonnegative. The feasible set is Z = X ×R n + . An allocation is a pair z = (x, p) = (x 1 , . . . , x n ; p 1 , . . . , p n ) ∈ Z, and agent i's assignment of z is z i = (x i , p i ).
Each agent i ∈ N has a quasi-linear preference (relation) R i on {0, 1} × R + ; that is, there is a valuation
Given a preference R i , we denote the associated strict and indifference relations by P i and I i respectively. 9 We denote the set of agent i's valuations by V i .
Let
denotes the valuation profile generated from v by replacing the valuations of the set N 0 of agents by b v N 0 . An (allocation) rule is a function f from V to Z. Given a rule f and a valuation profile v ∈ V , we write that
) denote the outcome item allocation and payments of f for v, respectively. In addition, we write
We introduce several conditions on rules. The first one is "efficiency". This condition states that a rule should maximize the total valuation.
Efficiency: for all v ∈ V , x(v) ∈ arg max{ P i∈N v i · x i : x ∈ X}. Next, we introduce impartiality conditions. The first such condition is equal bundles for equals 10 ; it states that a rule should give the same allocation to agents with the same valuation.
Equal bundles for equals: for all
Equal bundles for equals is an impartiality condition that is often used in social choice theory. However, in the environment where there are fewer units to be allocated than the number of agents, no rule satisfies equal bundles for equals. Thus, we introduce the following weaker condition of equal welfares for equals 11 ; it states that a rule should give indifferent bundles to agents with the same valuation.
Equal welfares for equals: for all
These two conditions say nothing about agents' bundles whose valuations are not equal. Thus, we introduce "anonymity conditions". Anonymity in bundle states that when the valuations of two agents are swapped, their bundles are also swapped. This condition requires a rule to treat agents equally from the viewpoints of agents who are ignorant of their own valuations or identities.
Note that anonymity in bundle implies equal bundles for equals, and that in our environment, no rule satisfies anonymity in bundle. Thus, we introduce a weaker condition of anonymity in welfare; it states that when the valuations of two agents are swapped, their welfare positions are also swapped. 12 Anonymity in welfare:
where
Note that anonymity in welfare implies equal welfares for equals. In Section 3, we employ this implication repeatedly to prove the Proposition below.
Envy-freeness requires that no agent should prefer another agent's bundle to his own. In contrast to the above anonymity conditions, this condition compares agents' welfare from the viewpoints of agents whose identities and valuations are specified.
Envy-freeness: for all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all j ∈ N, f i (v)R i f j (v).
The next requirement, strategy-proofness, is that for each agent, revealing his true valuation should be a dominant strategy in the direct revelation game. Since the dominant strategy equilibrium is a strong equilibrium concept, strategy-proofness gives agents strong incentives to represent their true valuations.
Individual rationality induces agents to participate voluntarily by guaranteeing that a rule never assigns an outcome that makes some agent worse off than he would be at his status quo (0, 0).
Given a valuation profile v ∈ V , we rank agents' valuations, and denote agent i's rank by r(v, i). That is, if v i is the highest in {v 1 , . . . , v n }, r(v, i) = 1; if it is the second highest, r(v, i) = 2; and so on. When several agents have the same valuation, ties are broken in a prespecified way.
One Definition: A Vickrey (allocation) rule is a rule f * = (x * (·), p * (·)) such that:
Since the Vickrey rules are accompanied by ranking functions, and since ranking functions are not unique, the Vickrey rules are not unique. In other words, there are as many Vickrey rules as ways of tie-breaking. However, unless several agents have the m−th highest valuation, regardless of ranking function, all the Vickrey rules give the same allocation. Furthermore, as Remark below states, all the Vickrey rules are welfare-equivalent. Therefore, we treat Vickrey rules as if they were unique.
Remark: Let f * and b f * be Vickrey rules. Then: By its definition, the Vickrey rule satisfies efficiency. It is straightforward that the Vickrey rule satisfies strategy-proofness and individual rationality. Theorem 1 below states that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying those three conditions. Theorem 1: A rule satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey rule.
Theorem follows from Holmström (1979) . The proof given below is a simplified version of the proof given by Chew and Serizawa (2007) .
Proof: We only show that if a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality, then it is the Vickrey rule. Let a rule f satisfy strategy-proofness, efficiency and individual rationality. Suppose that f is not the Vickrey rule.
Since f satisfies efficiency and individual rationality, there are v ∈ V and i ∈ N such
First, consider the case where
. Then, since f satisfies efficiency and individual rationality,
Next, consider the case where m+1) ). Then, since f satisfies efficiency and individual rationality,
, contradicting strategy-proofness. Hence, f is the Vickrey rule.
Q.E.D.
No rule satisfies anonymity in bundle in our model, but all the Vickrey rules satisfy anonymity in welfare. The Proposition below says that the condition of anonymity in welfare, together with strategy-proofness and individual rationality, implies efficiency. We prove this Proposition in Appendix.
Proposition: If a rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality, it also satisfies efficiency.
As Svensson (1983) shows, envy-freeness alone implies efficiency. As Example 3 illustrates, anonymity in welfare alone does not imply efficiency.
Example 3: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the rule such that if 1); (0, v 1 ) ). Then, f satisfies anonymity in welfare but not efficiency. The rule f also violates strategy-proofness and individual rationality.
As we mentioned above, the Vickrey rule satisfies strategy-proofness, individual rationality and anonymity in welfare. Thus, Theorem 1 and the Proposition together imply Theorem 2 below. Theorem 2 states that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying those three conditions. Theorem 2: A rule satisfies strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality if and only if it is the Vickrey rule.
The three examples below illustrate that the three axioms in Theorem 2 are independent.
Example 4: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the rule such that if 0); (1, 0) ), and if v 1 < 1, f (v) = ((0, 1); (0, 0)). Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness and individual rationality, but not anonymity in welfare.
Example 5: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the rule such that if 0); (v 1 , 0) ), and if v 1 < v 2 , f (v) = ((0, 1); (0, v 2 )). Then, f satisfies anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality, but not strategy-proofness.
Example 6: Let m = 1 and n = 2. Let f be the rule such that if 1); (v 2 , 2v 1 ) ). Then, f satisfies strategy-proofness, and anonymity in welfare, but not individual rationality.
Section 3 Concluding Remarks
In this article, we considered the problem of allocating finitely many units of an indivisible good when each agent receives at most one unit of the good and pays a non-negative price. We established that strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality together imply efficiency, and that the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. We close this article by mentioning open questions we left.
As we discussed in Introduction, Svensson (1983) showed that envy-freeness of allocation implies efficiency in a more general model with heterogeneous indivisible goods where even nonquasi-linear preferences are accommodated. The results of Holmström (1979) and Chew and Serizawa (2007) can be applied to general models with heterogeneous indivisible goods where agents may consume more than one indivisible good as long as preferences are quasi-linear. That is, the Vickrey rule is the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, efficiency, and individual rationality in such general models. We conjecture that i) strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality together also imply efficiency in general models, and that ii) the Vickrey rule is also the unique rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality in general models.
Hashimoto and Saitoh (2009) recently studied a queuing model in which preferences are quasi-linear, and are represented by constant unit waiting cost. They applied the proof techniques of our article to show that strategy-proofness and anonymity in welfare imply efficiency. Since positions in queue can be interpreted as heterogeneous indivisibles, their model is a model of heterogeneous indivisibles. Although their generalization is limited in the sense that preferences are represented by single parameters, Hashimoto and Saitoh's (2009) result suggests that the techniques we developed in our article will be useful in generalized models if the techniques are modified suitably. However, such modifications need considerable amount of effort, and so we leave them in this article although we believe that they are interesting questions in future research.
As Pápai (2003) showed, when agents may consume more than one indivisible good and valuations are not restricted, no rule in the class of Groves (including the Vickrey rule) satisfies envy-freeness. 13 On the other hand, the Vickrey rule satisfies anonymity in welfare even when agents may consume more than one indivisible good. Thus, the conjecture ii) above will contrast anonymity in welfare with envy-freeness if it is established.
Appendix: Proof of Proposition
In this appendix, we prove the Proposition stated in Section 2. First, we state and prove several lemmas as preliminary results.
Lemma 1 directly follows from individual rationality. Thus, we omit its proof. Lemma 2: Let f be a strategy-proof rule. For all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all
Proof: Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N, and b v i ∈ V i be such that
Let f be a strategy-proof and individually rational rule. a) For all v ∈ V , all i ∈ N, and all
Proof of a): Let v ∈ V , i ∈ N, and b
. This contradicts strategy-proofness. Therefore, x i (b v i , v −i ) = 0, and by Lemma 1,
Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality.
Proof of a): By Lemma 3-a), since x i (v) = 1 and
, and so by Lemma 1, Let f be a rule satisfying strategy-proofness, anonymity in welfare, and individual rationality. Let v ∈ V . We show that f (v) is efficient for v. Without loss of generality, 14 and let v = v m . Note that for all i ∈ N, v i > v implies i < m, and that v j < v implies j > n 0 . Therefore, f (v) is efficient for v if and only if (A) for all i ∈ N, v i > v implies x i (v) = 1, and (B) for all i ∈ N, x i (v) = 1 implies i ≤ n 0 . Thus, if f (v) is not efficient for v, then (A) or (B) is violated.
If (B) is violated, that is, if there is an agent i ∈ N such that x i (v) = 1 and i > n 0 , then we raise his valuation to b v i = v, and by Lemma 4-a), we obtain that
Since i > n 0 and there are only m units of the goods, it follows that there is an agent j < m such that
Thus, we assume that (A) is violated and derive a contradiction.
Since (A) is violated, there is an agent i such that v i > v and x i (v) = 0. v i > v implies i < m. We lower his valuation to b v i = v, and by Lemma 4-b), we obtain
Since i < m and the supply is m, there is an agent j such that j > n 0 , and x j (b v i , v −i ) = 1. j > n 0 implies v j < v. We raise the valuation of j to b v j = v, and by Lemma 4-a), we obtain , we obtain
In this manner, we can continue to apply Lemma 4-a) and 4-b) alternately. 15 As the result of the application of Lemma 4-a) and 4-b) respectively, we find an agent with a valuation below v who is awarded an object, and an agent with a valuation above v who is not awarded an object. We apply again Lemma 4-b) and 4-a), respectively, to these two cases. The application of Lemma 4-a) will alternate the outcome of all agents with the valuation of v from not having an object allocated to having an object allocated. On the other hand, the application of Lemma 4-b) will alternate the outcome of them 14 n 0 may be equal to m or n. In the case where n 0 = m, v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v m > v m+1 ≥ v m+2 ≥ · · · ≥ v n . In the case where n 0 = n, v 1 ≥ v 2 ≥ · · · ≥ v m = v m+1 = · · · = v n . 15 Serizawa (2006) , which is the previous version of this article, explains the details of this argument in the form of induction.
from having an object allocated to not having an object allocated. Notice that at each step there is one more agent with the valuation of v so that eventually there will be at least m + 1 agents with valuation v. This is a contradiction, since it is not possible to allocate more than m objects. This will happen at the latest at m−times application. But depending on the number of agents who started with the valuation of v, this could occur at an earlier step. Hence, efficiency must hold.
We have completed the proof of the Proposition.
